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Inspired by the flashing ratchet, Parrondo’s game presents an apparently paradoxical situation.
Parrondo’s game consists of two individual games, game A and game B. Game A is a slightly losing
coin-tossing game. Game B has two coins, with an integer parameter M . If the current cumulative
capital (in discrete unit) is a multiple of M , an unfavorable coin pb is used, otherwise a favorable
pg coin is used. Paradoxically, combination of game A and game B could lead to a winning game,
which is the Parrondo effect. We extend the original Parrondo’s game to include the possibility
of M being either M1 or M2. Also, we distinguish between strong Parrondo effect, i.e. two losing
games combine to form a winning game, and weak Parrondo effect, i.e. two games combine to form a
better-performing game. We find that when M2 is not a multiple of M1, the combination of B(M1)
and B(M2) has strong and weak Parrondo effect for some subsets in the parameter space (pb, pg),
while there is neither strong nor weak effect when M2 is a multiple of M1. Furthermore, when M2
is not a multiple of M1, stochastic mixture of game A may cancel the strong and weak Parrondo
effect. Following a discretization scheme in the literature of Parrondo’s game, we establish a link
between our extended Parrondo’s game with the analysis of discrete Brownian ratchet. We find a
relation between the Parrondo effect of our extended model to the macroscopic bias in a discrete
ratchet. The slope of a ratchet potential can be mapped to the fair game condition in the extended
model, so that under some conditions, the macroscopic bias in a discrete ratchet can provide a good
predictor for the game performance of the extended model. On the other hand, our extended model
suggests a design of a ratchet in which the potential is a mixture of two periodic potentials.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1992, Ajdari and Prost discovered a Brownian
ratchet mechanism [1], which was named by Astumian
and Bier [2] the flashing ratchet. Inspired by the flashing
ratchet, Parrondo [3] invented the games of chance later
known as Parrondo’s games, in which two losing games
can be combined following a random or periodic strategy
leading to a winning game. Later, Allison et al. [4] and
Toral et al. [5] demonstrated that Parrondo’s game can
be described by a discrete Fokker-Planck equation, thus
a more rigorous relation between Parrondo’s game and
Brownian ratchet was established. From the perspective
of game, the optimal sequence for a given set of param-
eters for Parrondo’s games was discovered by Dinis [6].
The games have also received attention in many other
fields [7], ranging from Brownian ratchets [8, 9], non-
linear dynamics [10–13], biology [14, 15], chemistry [16],
and economics [17]. Different variants of the original Par-
rondo’s games have been developed, including history-
dependent Parrondo’s game [18], Parrondo’s game with
self-transition [4] and multi-player version of Parrondo’s
game [19–21]. In particular, a variant called Parrondo’s
game with one-dimensional spatial dependence [22] has
been investigated by Mihailovic [23] and generalized to
synchronous case [24] and two-dimensional case [25].
Whether scale free network allows Parrondo’s games with
spatial dependence was also investigated [26–28]. Quan-
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tum versions of Parrondo’s games have also received at-
tention [29–32]. An optical model of quantum Parrondo’s
game was implemented experimentally [33], based on the
techniques developed in Ref. [34]. In an interesting pa-
per by Harmer et al. [35], the authors discussed several
open questions about Parrondo games. One of these open
questions concerned the possibility of different M during
play.
Since Parrondo’s game was inspired by the flashing
ratchet, a question was raised whether one can infer char-
acteristics of certain continuous Brownian ratchets from
extended versions of the original Parrondo’s game. This
line of research was pursued by Harmer et al. [36] with
preliminary results. In addition to the usual game A and
game B, the integer parameter M in the B game can as-
sume different values between 3 and 10 with equal proba-
bility at each game. It was demonstrated by simulations
that under this setting other counter-intuitive phenom-
ena would occur. The motivation for randomizingM was
that M controls the period of the ratchet potential and
therefore randomizing M means randomizing the period
of the ratchet potential. The Parrondo’s game extended
in this way corresponds to a type of Brownian ratchets
other than the flashing ratchet. We follow this line of
research and use a different but similar model, in which
M can be either ofM1 and M2. Restricting M to be one
of only two values allows systematic investigations while
one can still observe interesting phenomena. Among the
various properties of our extended model, we point out
the significance of weak Parrondo effect, which is the sit-
uation when two games, which need not be both losing,
combines to form a better game in the sense of losing less
2or even winning more. Weak Parrondo effect is a natural
and meaningful extension to the well-known Parrondo
effect: two losing games combine to become a winning
game. We show that this distinction between the strong
and weak Parrondo effect is significant in our extended
model.
The paper is organized as follows: we begin by in-
troducing the original Parrondo’s game and its Markov
chain formulation in Sec. II. In Sec. III we present the
formulation of our extended Parrondo’s game. In Sec.
IV, we show the conditions under which there are strong
Parrondo effects for our extended Parrondo game with
B(M1) and B(M2) and the further mixture with game
A. In Sec. V, we discuss new features of mixing two B
games (with or without mixing also with game A) that
we call the weak Parrondo effect. In Sec. VI, we apply
the Fokker-Planck dicretization scheme on the extended
model, and show the properties of our extended model
from the perspective of discrete Brownian ratchets. Con-
cluding remarks can be found in Sec. VII.
II. THE ORIGINAL PARRONDO’S GAME:
(A,B(M))
The original Parrondo’s game consists of two individ-
ual coin tossing games, namely game A and game B.
Game A has only one coin, whose winning probability is
pA = 1/2−ǫ, where ǫ is a small and positive number. Let
X(t) be the cumulative capital of the player at time t,
a non-negative integer. If the player keeps playing game
A, the average capital satisfies
〈X(t+ 1)〉 = 〈X(t)〉+ 2pA − 1, (1)
where 〈·〉 is understood as ensemble average. We define
the long-term expected gain as
g ≡ lim
t→∞
〈X(t+ 1)〉 − 〈X(t)〉, (2)
which in many cases exists. If 〈X(t + 1)〉 − 〈X(t)〉 os-
cillates in a limit cycle, then g is understood to be an
average over a limit cycle. Thus with pA = 1/2, g is zero
as this is a trivial unbiased random walk. In the context
of Parrondo’s game [37], a winning game is one that has
positive g. A fair game is one with g = 0 in the long run
or g with zero average over a limit cycle. For positive ǫ,
g = −2ǫ and game A is a losing game
Game B has two coins, one “good” coin and one “bad”
coin. B game has an integer parameter M . If X(t) is a
multiple of M , then X(t+1) is determined by the “bad”
coin with winning probability pb = 1/10 − ǫ, otherwise
the “good” coin with winning probability pg = 3/4− ǫ is
used.
Similar to game A, if the player keeps playing game B
only, the average capital satisfies
〈X(t+1)〉 = 〈X(t)〉+2(π0(t)pb+(1−π0(t))pg)− 1, (3)
which explicitly depends on π0, the probability that
X(t) = 0 mod M . Harmer and Abbott [38] showed that
game B is a losing game with pb = 1/10− ǫ, pg = 3/4− ǫ
and M = 3, with positive ǫ.
If we model the Parrondo’s game as a discrete-time
Markov chain as in Ref. [39], we can define the probabil-
ity vector (for simplicity we set M = 3 for the purpose
of demonstration) pi(t) ≡ (π0(t), π1(t), π2(t))
T
. Accord-
ingly, the transition matrix for game A is
ΠA =

 0 1− pA pApA 0 1− pA
1− pA pA 0

 , (4)
such that the time evolution equation is pi(t + 1) =
ΠApi(t). Similarly, the transition matrix for game B is
ΠB =

 0 1− pg pgpb 0 1− pg
1− pb pg 0

 . (5)
The stochastic mixture of game A and B has the fol-
lowing transition matrix
Π = γΠA + (1 − γ)ΠB, (6)
where γ is the probability of playing game A in the
stochastic mixing of game A and B. Parrondo’s game
can also be played according to a periodic game sequence
such as ABABB, in which case the probability vector is
evolved by multiplying pi with ΠA or ΠB according to
the sequence.
Parrondo’s game has a seemingly paradoxical property
that while game A and B are losing when they are played
individually, the stochastic mixture of game A and B, or
playing according to a deterministic sequence may lead
to a winning combined game for small positive value of ǫ.
For the detailed analysis of the apparent paradox, please
refer to Ref. [39]. In summary, since the two games are
coupled non-linearly through X(t), the combination of
the two losing games are non-linear and in general it is
not surprising that a winning game can emerge from their
combination. In the context of Parrondo’s game, the phe-
nomenon that two losing games can be combined to pro-
duce a winning game is called the Parrondo effect. An
interesting and related phenomenon also deserves inves-
tigation, namely that two games, not necessarily losing,
combine to form a game that performs better, though
not necessarily winning, than either of the two individual
games, which will be called weak Parrondo effect. Obvi-
ously, the criteria for Parrondo effect fits the criteria for
weak Parrondo effect, but the reverse is not true.
III. THE EXTENDED GAME: (B(M1), B(M2))
In the original Parrondo’s game, while M could be
any integer larger than three, analysis of the game fo-
cused on the case of M = 3. In early literature [40, 41],
there were discussions on the effects of randomizing
the parameter M . With preliminary results, Ref. [40]
demonstrated by randomizing M , additional complex
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Figure 1. Expected capital 〈X(t)〉 for game
B(3), B(4), B(3, 4, C = 0.2) and switching sequence (34344).
A line is added to 〈X(t)〉 for visualization purpose. For
B(4), B(3, 4, 0.2) and the game sequence, every data point
is a moving average over two consecutive time steps, in
order to smooth out the oscillation. Parameters used:
pb = 0.1, pg = 0.67. Both stochastic mixture and determinis-
tic switching of game B(3) and B(4) could lead to a winning
combined game, even without game A.
and counter-intuitive phenomena could be observed. In-
spired by this early effort, we systematically investigate
the case where the value of M of game B can take ei-
ther M1 or M2 (without loss of generality we always as-
sume M2 > M1). In our work, we always assume that
pb1 = pb2, pg1 = pg2 for the two individual B games
B(M1, pb1, pg1) and B(M2, pb2, pg2). SinceM is no longer
a fixed value of the game, a game B with a particular
value of M is designated by B(M). The full specifica-
tion of a B game should be written as B(M,pb, pg), but
for simplicity we do not write its dependence on pb and
pg explicitly. Similar to the mixture of game A and B
in the original game, our extended model allowed the
stochastic mixture and deterministic switching of B(M1)
and B(M2). Using the notations of discrete time Markov
chain, the stochastic mixture of B(M1) and B(M2) is
equivalent to the linear combination of two transition ma-
trices, ΠB(M1), ΠB(M2), corresponding to B(M1) and
B(M2), respectively:
ΠB(M1,M2, C) = C ΠB(M1) + (1− C)ΠB(M2), (7)
where C is the probability of using B(M1) in the
stochastic mixture of B(M1) and B(M2) denoted by
B(M1,M2, C). Notice that since the dimension of
ΠB(M1,M2, C) is LCM(M1,M2) (LCM stands for least
common multiple), Both transition matrices ΠB(M1)
and ΠB(M2) have to be expanded to LCM(M1,M2) ×
LCM(M1,M2) matrices. Fig. 1 shows that both stochas-
tic mixture and deterministic switching could lead to a
winning game.
We can also include game A into the stochastic mixture
by
Π = γΠA + (1− γ)ΠB(M1,M2, C). (8)
Markov chain analysis shows that given C and γ, a
Parrondo’s game, be it individual game or stochastic mix-
ture game, is wining, losing or fair depending only on the
values of pb and pg. A plot of “winning-losing region”
Γ=0
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Γ=0.7
Winning Region
Losing region
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Figure 2. The winning and losing regions in the parameter
space for the original Parrondo’s game. By definition, the two
regions are separated by Eq. 9. The parameter for game A,
pA, is fixed at 0.5 to preserve its analogy with pure diffusion
process. As γ increases, the fair game boundary becomes less
and less convex.
is particularly useful in explaining and investigating the
seemingly paradoxical property of Parrondo’s game. For
the original Parrondo’s game, a fair game corresponds to
a point (pg, pb) in the parameter space satisfying the fol-
lowing condition [39, 42] (for the derivation, please refer
to the appendix):
(γpA + (1 − γ)pb) (γpA + (1− γ)pg)
2 =
(1− (γpA + (1− γ)pb))(1 − (γpA + (1− γ)pg))
2.
(9)
Eq. 9 defines the fair game boundary, in the parameter
space (pg, pb) and partitions the parameter space into a
“winning” region and a “losing” region. See Fig. 2 for the
fair game boundary with several values of γ. The results
should be interpreted in the following fashion: given a
fixed value of pA (which is set to 0.5 to preserve the anal-
ogy with diffusion process) and γ, a particular Parrondo’s
game, corresponding to a point (pg, pb), is winning if the
point is above the fair game boundary (which is deter-
mined by the value of γ), losing if below the boundary.
When γ increases, the fair game boundary shifts such
that the winning region becomes larger. Also, when γ
increases, the fair game boundary becomes less convex,
which will be an important factor when we consider the
generalization to the extended game.
IV. STRONG PARRONDO EFFECT IN THE
EXTENDED MODEL
In the original Parrondo’s game, the fair game condi-
tion (Eq. 9) can be rewritten as
p0p1p2 = (1 − p0)(1− p1)(1 − p2), (10)
where pi is the transition probability from state i to state
i+1, and implicitly we model the game as a discrete time
Markov chain, in which the transition probability P (i→
j) = 0 unless j = i±1 and P (i→ j) = P (i+3→ j+3). In
other words, it is a random walk with spatially-periodic
transition probabilities. According to Ref. [42], a winning
4Parrondo’s game corresponds to a Markov chain that is
transient towards ∞, a fair game corresponds to a chain
that is recurrent and a losing game corresponds to a chain
that is transient towards −∞. The fair game condition
is therefore the condition under which the correspond-
ing Markov chain is recurrent. For a random walk with
spatially-periodic transition probabilities (period L), the
condition under which it is recurrent, and therefore the
fair game condition for a general Parrondo’s game with
period L, is
L−1∏
i=0
pi =
L−1∏
i=0
(1− pi), (11)
where pi is the transition probability from state i to state
i+1. The fair game condition for B(M1,M2) is therefore
(please refer to the appendix for the derivation)
pbp
Q
g α
L/M1−1βL/M2−1 = (1− pb)
(1− pg)
Q (1− α)L/M1−1 (1− β)L/M2−1 ,
(12)
where α = (C pb + (1− C)pg), β = ((1− C)pb + C pg),
Q = L− L/M1 − L/M2 + 1, and L = LCM(M1,M2).
0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95
0.00
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p b
BH3L BH4L BH3,4,C=0.25L
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Losing region
Figure 3. Fair game boundaries for B(3), B(4) and
B(3, 4, C = 0.25). The shaded area is inside the winning
region for B(3, 4, C = 0.25) but is inside the losing regions for
both B(3) and B(4). This means, given any point (pg, pb) in
the shaded area, stochastic mixture of B(3) and B(4) results
in a winning combined game while the individual games are
losing. We call the shaded region the strong Parrondo region,
or more precisely the subset of parameter space, S(3, 4, 0.25).
Fig. 3 shows the fair game boundaries for B(3), B(4)
and B(3, 4, C = 0.25). The shaded area is of great inter-
est: the area is inside the winning region for B(3, 4, C =
0.25) but is also inside the losing regions for both B(3)
and B(4). This means, given any point (pg, pb) in the
shaded area, stochastic mixture of B(3) and B(4) re-
sults in a winning combined game while the individual
games are losing. In the extended model, two losing B
games can be stochastically mixed to be a winning game,
demonstrating strong Parrondo effect. We call the afore-
mentioned area in the parameter space strong Parrondo
region. More precisely, let us first define
S(M1,M2, C)
= {(pg, pb)|g(M1,M2, C) > 0 and g(M1) < 0
and g(M2) < 0}.
(13)
This is the set of points in the parameter space where the
combined game B(M1,M2, C) has a positive long-term
expected gain g, while the two individual games B(M1)
and B(M2) have negative g. The set S(3, 4, 0.25) is thus
the strong Parrondo region (shaded area in Fig. 3) when
C = 0.25. The statement that there exists a non-empty
set S(M1,M2, C) for some value of C is thus equivalent
to the statement that strong Parrondo effect exist in the
parameter space of pg and pb for this value of C.
However, not very pair of B(M1) and B(M2) is able
to form a winning stochastic mixture game B(M1,M2).
One can show, using elementary geometry, that in the
parameter space only when ∀ k ∈ N,M2 6= kM1, does
S(M1,M2, C) exist for some value of C in the range from
0 to 1.
Here we only give a sketch of the proof. For games
B(M1) and B(M2), the fair game boundaries are
pb p
M1−1
g = (1 − pb)(1− pg)
M1−1 (14)
and
pb p
M2−1
g = (1− pb)(1 − pg)
M2−1. (15)
First we consider the end point at pg = 0.5, pb =
0.5, since Eq. 12, Eq. 14 and Eq. 15 will all pass this
end point. We differentiate Eq. 12, 14 and 15 to ob-
tain dpb/dpg|M1,M2 , dpb/dpg|M1 and dpb/dpg|M2 at this
point. The derivatives are
dpb
dpg
∣∣∣∣
M
= 1−M, (16)
so dpb/dpg|M1 = 1−M1 and dpb/dpg|M2 = 1−M2. For
the stochastic mixture,
dpb
dpg
∣∣∣∣
M1,M2
= 1−
M1M2
CM2 + (1− C)M1
. (17)
Clearly, dpb/dpg|M2 < dpb/dpg|M1,M2 < dpb/dpg|M1 .
Next, we consider the other end point at pg = 1, pb = 0,
since Eq. 12, Eq. 14 and Eq. 15 will also all pass through
this end point. Here, the derivatives dpb/dpg are all zero
for the three games, so instead we consider the three
derivatives at pg = 1 − ǫ, where ǫ is a small number
and has no relation with the parameters of the original
Parrondo’s game. At pg = 1− ǫ,
dpb
dpg
∣∣∣∣
M1,M2
∼ ǫL−L/M1−L/M2 as ǫ→ 0, (18)
and
dpb
dpg
∣∣∣∣
M
∼ ǫM−2 as ǫ→ 0. (19)
When ∀k ∈ N,M2 6= kM1, L − L/M1 − L/M2 >
M2 − 2 > M1 − 2, which means dpb/dpg|M1,M2 goes to
zero asymptotically faster than dpb/dpg|M2 as ǫ → 0.
Considering that the slopes of the three fair game con-
ditions are monotonically decreasing in pg, there must
5exists a point of intersection between Eq. 12 and Eq. 15,
and hence S(M1,M2, C) is non-empty for all C ∈ (0, 1).
If ∃k ∈ N such that M2 = kM1, or equivalently, M2 is
a multiple of M1,
dpb
dpg
∣∣∣∣
M1,M2
∼ ǫM2−k−1 as ǫ→ 0. (20)
Clearly, M1 − 2 < M2 − k − 1 < M2 − 2, which leads
to the absence of intersection point between Eq. 12 and
Eq. 15. For this reason, S(M1,M2, C) is empty for all
C ∈ (0, 1). In other words, there is no strong Parrondo
region in this case. For the case when ∀k ∈ N,M2 6=
kM1, the position of the point of intersection (p
∗
g, p
∗
b)
can be calculated numerically in great accuracy. Since
(p∗g, p
∗
b) satisfies Eq. 15, p
∗
g is sufficient to characterise the
point of intersection. We use the notation p∗g(M1,M2, C)
(or p∗b(M1,M2, C), since one is a function of the other)
to designate the point of intersection as a function of
M1,M2 and C. Numerical results show that in gen-
eral p∗g(M1,M2, C) is an increasing function of C, while
p∗b(M1,M2, C) is a decreasing function of C.
Physically, stochastic mixture of B(M1,M2, C) with
game A can be regarded as imposing a pure diffusion
process with a particular strength on a random walk
process in a spatially periodically fluctuating environ-
ment. To see the effect of game A on the extended
model, we can make a simple substitution on Eq. 12 us-
ing pg → γ pA + (1 − γ)pg and pb → γ pA + (1 − γ)pb.
The matrix notation of this stochastic mixture is Eq. 8.
We use A(γ)⊕B(M1,M2, C) to designate such stochas-
tic mixture. To preserve the analogy between game A
and pure diffusion process, we set pA = 0.5. We show in
Fig. 4a and 4b for the effects of stochastic mixture with
game A from the perspective of the fair game bound-
aries. As γ increases, the fair game boundaries for B
games become less convex in a way similar to the orig-
inal Parrondo’s game. Also, the point of intersection
p∗g(M1,M2, C) moves downward in the parameter space.
The upshot is the strong Parrondo region S(M1,M2, C)
shrinks as γ increases, and beyond a critical value γcs,
S(M1,M2, C) becomes empty. More precisely,
γcs = inf {γ|S(M1,M2, C) = ∅} . (21)
γcs can be calculated numerically in great accuracy. Since
when p∗b(M1,M2, C) = 0, γ = γcs, we can calculate γcs
by solving p∗b(M1,M2, C) = 0. See Fig. 5 for γcs as a
function of C for several pairs of M1,M2. In general,
γcs is a decreasing function of C. We can understand
this result in the following way: since p∗b(M1,M2, C) is a
decreasing function of C, as C increases, less amount of
game A is needed to “drag” the point of intersection down
to pb = 0. Numerical calculation shows that the addition
of game A will not introduce strong Parrondo region to
the parameter space when ∃ k such that M2 = kM1.
BH3L
BH4L
BH3,4L,C=0.2
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(a) for A(0.15) ⊕ B(3),
A(0.15) ⊕B(4) and
A(0.15) ⊕ B(3, 4, 0.2)
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BH3,4L,C=0.2
0.60 0.65 0.70 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.900.00
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0.10
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0.20
pg
p b
(b) for A(0.35) ⊕ B(3),
A(0.35) ⊕B(4) and
A(0.35) ⊕ B(3, 4, 0.2)
Figure 4. The effect of B(3, 4, 0.2) stochastically mixed with
game A with different values of γ. In 4a, despite that the
fair game boundaries for the three games become less convex,
the strong Parrondo region still exists, or S(3, 4, 0.2) is non-
empty. In 4b, however, the strong Parrondo region ceases to
exist, or equivalently S(3, 4, 0.2) = ∅.
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0C
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Γcs
BH3,4L BH4,5L BH5,6L
Figure 5. Critical value of γ for strong Parrondo effect, γcs,
as a function of C for several pairs of M1,M2. The value of
γcs is a decreasing function of C.
V. WEAK PARRONDO EFFECT IN THE
EXTENDED MODEL
The investigation of the weak Parrondo effect in the
extended model requires the calculation of the expected
gain (Eq. 2). This can be achieved in more than one
way. One can solve Eq. 8 for the stationary probability
vector and obtain g from it. One can also derive a general
formula for g like the one in Ref. [43, 44]. We extend the
definition of the strong Parrondo region to accommodate
the weak Parrondo region:
S(M1,M2, C, g0)
= {(pg, pb)|g(M1,M2, C) > g0 and g(M1) < g0
and g(M2) < g0},
(22)
which is the set of points in the parameter space where
the combined game B(M1,M2, C) with long-term ex-
pected gain more than g0 while the two individual games
B(M1) and B(M2) gain less than g0 per time step. The
strong Parrondo region is thus a special case with g0 = 0,
or equivalently S(M1,M2, C) ≡ S(M1,M2, C, 0). The
6Weak Parrondo Region
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Figure 6. Weak Parrondo region W(3, 4, 0.2) (to the right
of the dotted line) and strong Parrondo region S(3, 4, 0.2)
(shaded region). The set S(3, 4, 0.2) is a non-trivial subset of
W(3, 4, 0.2). In fact, under this setting (M1 = 3,M2 = 4, C =
0.2), W(3, 4, 0.2) is much larger in area than S(3, 4, 0.2).
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Figure 7. The critical value of γ for the weak Parrondo region,
γcw, and γcs as a function of C for B(3, 4) and B(3, 5). For
every C, γcw > γcs.
weak Parrondo region, or
W(M1,M2, C)
= {(pg, pb)|g(M1,M2, C) > g(M1) and
g(M1,M2, C) > g(M2)}
(23)
satisfies
W(M1,M2, C) =
⋃
g0∈R
S(M1,M2, C, g0). (24)
Fig. 6 shows the weak Parrondo regionW(3, 4, 0.2) and
strong Parrondo region S(3, 4, 0.2). Clearly, S(3, 4, 0.2) is
a non-trivial subset of W(3, 4, 0.2).
We have just shown that the further addition of game
A could shrink the strong Parrondo region to an empty
set. Numerical results show that the weak Parrondo re-
gion W(M1,M2, C) also shrink as γ increases and the
property S(M1,M2, C) ⊂ W(M1,M2, C) holds. There
also exists a critical value γcw(C) (in general larger than
γcs(C)), beyond which the weak Parrondo region be-
comes an empty set. See Fig. 7 for γcw and γcs as a
function of C for B(3, 4) and B(3, 5). We observe that
γcw > γcs for every C. Therefore, backed up by numeri-
cal calculations, weak Parrondo effect is a generalization
of strong Parrondo effect, in the parameter space, in the
sense that S(M1,M2, C) ⊂ W(M1,M2, C). The weak
Parrondo effect is more robust than strong Parrondo ef-
fect in the face of imposed diffusion process.
VI. EXTENDED PARRONDO’S GAME AS A
DISCRETE BROWNIAN RATCHET
While Parrondos games were originally inspired by the
flashing ratchet, no direct relation was established be-
tween them until the work of Allison et al. [4, 45] and
Toral et al. [5, 43, 46] appeared. The establishment of
the connection requires the discretization of the Fokker-
Planck equation and the matching up of the discrete
Fokker-Planck equation with the master equation of Par-
rondo’s game. In this work, we adopt the discretiza-
tion scheme employed by Toral et al since it produces
intuitive discrete ratchet potential and probability cur-
rent. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the potentials
resulted from the two approaches coincide in the limit of
an infinitesimally small space-discretized step[47]. The
discrete ratchet potential corresponding to a Parrondo’s
game is:
Vi = −
1
2
ln
[
i∏
k=1
qk−1
1− qk
]
, (25)
where qk is the transition probability from state k to k+1.
The ratchet potential corresponding to a winning game
is decreasing in trend. Similarly, the ratchet potential
corresponding to a losing game is increasing in trend and
for fair game the ratchet potential is constant in trend.
To capture the trend of a ratchet potential, we define a
quantity called the macroscopic bias
E = −
VL
L
=
1
2L
ln
[
L∏
k=1
qk
1− qk
]
, (26)
which is just the average potential drop over one spatial
period. Because of the minus sign, a winning game has
a positive bias, a losing game has a negative bias and
a fair game has zero bias, which is consistent with the
fair game condition for the Parrondo’s game. Thus, the
quantity
∏L
k=1
qk
1− qk
in Eq. 26 provides a convenient
way for relating the result of the Parrondo’s game to the
potential drop in the Brownian ratchet.
In the discrete ratchet picture, the original Parrondo’s
paradox is equivalent to the situation that two ratchet
potentials with zero macroscopic bias, or even slightly
negative bias, combining through Eq. 25, form a ratchet
potential with positive macroscopic bias. In the original
7Parrondo’s game, starting from a discrete ratchet poten-
tial Vi(M) corresponding to fair game B (zero macro-
scopic bias), the addition of game A will introduce a
positive bias and modify the intensity of local fluctua-
tions (measured by Vi− i E). In the extended Parrondo’s
game, however, the combination of two ratchet potentials
Vi(M1) and Vi(M2) leads to a complicated ratchet poten-
tial Vi(M1,M2, C) which in general has different macro-
scopic bias from Vi(M1) and Vi(M2), different intensity
of local fluctuations, and vastly different overall potential
profile, as shown in Fig. 8.
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Figure 8. Discrete ratchet potential for B(3), B(4) and
B(3, 4, 0.15). The parameters are pb = 0.1 and pg = 0.7.
The probability current [48] is
J =
1
2
P st0
1− e2VL∑L
j=1
e2Vj
2− 2pj
, (27)
where P st0 is the stationary probability at state 0 modulo
L given by the implicit relation
P sti = e
−2Vi

P st0 − 2J i∑
j=1
e2Vj
2− 2pj

 (28)
and the normalization condition,
∑L−1
i=0 P
st
i = 1,
gives a complicated solution of P st0 . This formula-
tion of probability current is consistent with the result
of Markov chain analysis since g(pg, pb,M1,M2, C) =
LCM(M1,M2)J(pg, pb,M1,M2, C) analytically.
While the sign of E tells whether a Parrondo’s game
is winning or losing (positive E corresponds to a winning
game), the relative magnitudes of two ratchet potentials
E1, E2 do not tell which one is winning more, i.e. having
a larger g, since there is no one-to-one correspondence
between E and g. In fact, it can be shown that
max
0≤pg≤1,0≤pb≤1
g(pg, pb,M1,M2, C) =
2
e−2E0 + 1
− 1
subject to E(pg, pb) = E0.
(29)
The maximum is achieved when pg = pb, which corre-
sponds to the case where Vi = −
i
2
ln
(
pg
1− pg
)
. The
minimum of g(pg, pb,M1,M2, C) subject to E(pg, pb) =
E0 is zero, when pg → 1, pb → 0 and V1 → ∞, corre-
sponding to the case when V1 is so large that it blocks
the movement of particles entirely, regardless of whether
macroscopic bias is finite and non-zero.
Let us use the following notation
D(M1,M2, C)
= {(pg, pb)|E(M1,M2, C) > E(M2)},
(30)
F(M1,M2, C)
= {(pg, pb)|E(M1,M2, C) > E(M1)}
(31)
and
P = {(pg, pb)|0 ≤ pb ≤ 0.5, 0.5 ≤ pg ≤ 1}. (32)
Since the sign of E determine whether a game is winning
or losing, the relative magnitudes of E for different games
could give a naive expectation of whether one game per-
forms better (measured in the long-term average gain g)
than the other. In the application to the extended game,
it provides a simple guideline in predicting whether the
combined game B(M1,M2, C) performs better than the
two individual games. It is not difficult to show that
E(M2) > E(M1) if M2 > M1 for 0 ≤ pb ≤ 0.5 and
0.5 ≤ pg ≤ 1. Also, E(M1) < E(M1,M2, C) < E(M2) if
M2 is a multiple ofM1 for 0 ≤ pb ≤ 0.5 and 0.5 ≤ pg ≤ 1.
These two properties coincide with the real game perfor-
mances. For other M pairs, the boundary is described
by
pRg α
L/M1−1βL/M2−1 = (1 − pg)
R
(1− α)L/M1−1(1 − β)L/M2−1,
(33)
where R = L−L/M1−L/M2−M2+2, α = C pb+(1−
C)pg, β = ((1 − C)pb + C pg), L = LCM(M1,M2). One
can verify that the point of intersection between Eq. 12
and Eq. 15 is a solution to Eq. 33, which means the exis-
tence of the point of intersection guarantee the existence
of D(M1,M2, C). Since for M2 6= kM1 ∀k ∈ N, the
point of intersection exists for all C, D(M1,M2, C) exists
for all C. The existence of F(M1,M2, C), however, can
only be found out numerically.
We show in Fig. 9 the partitions of parameter space
with regard to relative magnitude of macroscopic bias
and long-term expected gain of the three games. In
the region of parameter space defined by the set 1,
E(3) < E(3, 4, C) < E(4) and g(3) < g(3, 4, C) < g(4)
hold simultaneously. In set 3 of the parameter space,
E(3) < E(4) < E(3, 4, C) and g(3) < g(4) < g(3, 4, C)
hold simultaneously. Therefore, in these two sets, the
relation among the bias of the three games is consistent
with the relation among the game performances of the
three games.
To summarise, when M2 is a multiple of M1,
the relation among E(M1), E(M2) and E(M1,M2, C)
is consistent with the relation among g(M1), g(M2)
and g(M1,M2, C). In other words, E(M1) <
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Figure 9. Various partitions in the parameter space. (a) for
small C and (b) for large C. Set 2 ∪ 3 is D(3, 4, C). Set
1 ∪ 2 ∪ 3 ∪ 4 is F(3, 4, C). In (a), set 3 ∪ 4 ∪ 5 is W(3, 4, C).
In (b), set 3 ∪ 4 ∪ 5′ is W(3, 4, C). Set 1 is where E(3) <
E(3, 4, C) < E(4) and g(3) < g(3, 4, C) < g(4). Set 3 is
where E(3) < E(4) < E(3, 4, C) and g(3) < g(4) < g(3, 4, C).
Set 1∪ 3 is where relation among the bias of the three games
is consistent with the relation among the game performance
of the three games.
E(M1,M2, C) < E(M2) and g(M1) < g(M1,M2, C) <
g(M2) hold simultaneously. When ∀k ∈ N,M2 6= kM1,
there exists one subset F(M1,M2, C)\(W(M1,M2, C) ∪
D(M1,M2, C)) in which E(3) < E(3, 4, C) < E(4) and
g(3) < g(3, 4, C) < g(4) hold simultaneously and an-
other subset W(M1,M2, C) ∩ D(M1,M2, C) in which
E(3) < E(4) < E(3, 4, C) and g(3) < g(4) < g(3, 4, C)
hold simultaneously. The exact counterpart of game per-
formance in the discrete ratchet picture is the probability
current (Eq. 27), which has a different form from E, so it
is not surprising to see the two quantities behave differ-
ently on some occasions. The interesting thing is in some
region of the parameter space, namely 1∪3 in Fig. 9, the
two quantities behave in a similar way.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We have extended the original Parrondo’s game to al-
low M to be either M1 or M2. We have discussed the
distinction between the strong Parrondo effect and the
weak Parrondo effect, which plays an important role in
the extended model. In the extended game, two individ-
ual games B(M1) and B(M2) can stochastically mix to
form a better-performing game, including both the strong
and the weak Parrondo effects, if and only if M2 is not
a multiple of M1. If M2 is a multiple of M1, it is impos-
sible to obtain a better-performing game by combining
B(M1) and B(M2), meaning the absence of both strong
and weak Parrondo effect. Further addition of game A,
in analogy to a pure diffusion process imposed on the
game, can destroy the strong and the weak Parrondo ef-
fect, but the weak Parrondo effect is more robust against
the imposed pure diffusion process.
We have shown the physical meaning of our extended
model in terms of discrete ratchet potentials obtained
through the discretization of Fokker-Planck equation.
We have identified an important quantity, the macro-
scopic bias, or the average drop in the discrete ratchet
potential in one spatial period. While macroscopic bias
is not the same as the performance of the game, measured
by long-term expected gain, the relation among the bias
of the three games (B(M1), B(M2) and B(M1,M2, C))
in some case is in agreement with the relative perfor-
mance of the three games. If M2 is a multiple of M1,
the relation among E(M1), E(M2) and E(M1,M2, C) is
in agreement with the relation among g(M1), g(M2) and
g(M1,M2, C) in the whole parameter space. If M2 is not
a multiple of M1, there exists a proper subset in which
the relations of the two quantities agree with each other.
Our model assumes pb1 = pb2, pg1 = pg2 for
B(M1, pb1, pg1) and B(M2, pb2, pg2) for the benefit of a
systematic investigation, since if we remove these as-
sumptions, the parameter space will be four-dimensional.
More features are expected to emerge if we relax these
constrictions. For future work, we can allowM to be one
of three possible values, such as 3,4 and 5. A stochastic
mixture of B(3), B(4) and B(5) is expected to produce
a game that performs better than the stochastic mix-
ture of any pair chosen from B(3), B(4) and B(5) for
some point in the parameter space. Moreover, Toral’s
game [49] is one version of multi-player Parrondo’s game,
and it contains a modified game A that redistributes
the wealth between players, resembling strong interac-
tion between Brownian particles, from the perspective of
discrete ratchet. Incorporating Toral’s modified game A
into our extended model, we could create a new version
of Parrondo’s game which is the counterpart of solitonic
flashing ratchet [50].
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IX. APPENDIX: THE DERIVATION OF FAIR
GAME CONDITION
Parrondo’s game, be it original or extended, can be
modeled as a discrete time random walk on the integer
set Z (Fig. 10a). For example, game B(M = 3) has a
corresponding Markov chain depicted in Fig. 10b. The
Markov chain for game A is a special case of game B
where pg = pb. The stochastic mixture of game A and B
will not modify the structure of the Markov chain, but
will merely change the transition probabilities at each
site by pg → γpA + (1− γ)pg and pb → γpA + (1− γ)pb.
According to Ref. [37], in the context of Parrondo’s game,
a fair game will have a corresponding recurrent Markov
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Figure 10. The discrete time Markov chain for 10a general
random walk 10b for game B(M = 3). In 10a pi = P (i →
i + 1) is the transition probability from state i to i + 1, and
qi ≡ 1 − pi. In 10b, p3k = pb, p1+3k = p2+3k = pg,∀k ∈ Z.
qg ≡ 1− pg and qb ≡ 1− pb.
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Figure 11. Reduced Markov chain for game B(M = 3).
chain. For a winning game, the chain is transient towards
∞ while for a losing game the chain is transient towards
−∞. For a random walk which transition probability
is periodic, i.e. pi = pi+kL, ∀k ∈ Z, the condition of
recurrence is
L−1∏
i=0
pi =
L−1∏
i=0
(1− pi), (34)
where L = 3 for B(M = 3). The proof of the condition
for recurrence can be found in many standard textbook
on Markov chain and will be omitted here. Plug in p0 =
γpA + (1 − γ)pb and p1 = p2 = γpA + (1 − γ)pg we will
recover Eq. 9.
Because of the periodic nature of the transition prob-
abilities, Markov chain depicted in Fig. 10b can be re-
duced to one with only three states, depicted in Fig. 11.
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Figure 12. Extended finite state Markov chain for 12a B(3)
and 12b B(4).
However, the state probability becomes
πˆi(t) =
∞∑
k=−∞
πi+kL, (35)
where L = 3 for B(M = 3).
For a extended game B(M1,M2, C), say M1 = 3 and
M2 = 4, first we have to extend the finite state Markov
chains with three states (for B(3)) and four states (for
B(4)) to two equivalent Markov chains with twelve states
(Fig. 12a and 12b). To get the Markov chain correspond-
ing to B(3, 4, C), we need to add the transition probabil-
ities together by pi = C pi(M = 3) + (1 − C)pi(M = 4).
In B(3, 4, C), the transition probability can only be one
of the following four values: pg, pb, C pg +(1−C)pb and
C pb + (1−C)pg. Out of the twelve transition probabili-
ties {pi},
p0 = pb,
p3 = p6 = p9 = C pb + (1− C)pg,
p4 = p8 = C pg + (1− C)pb,
p1 = p2 = p5 = p7 = p10 = p11 = pg.
(36)
Plug them into the recurrence condition Eq. 34 and one
will get
pbp
6
gα
3β2 = (1 − pb)(1− pg)
6 (1− α)3 (1− β)2 , (37)
where α = (C pb + (1− C)pg), β = ((1− C)pb + C pg).
This is a special case for fair game condition for general
pair of M1 and M2, i.e. Eq. 12.
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